The Ripeness Doctrine

Article III of the United States Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over specific disputes. The U.S. Supreme Court has established four justiciability doctrines based on Article III. These doctrines restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts in adjudicating legal disputes and are as follows:

• The standing doctrine tells us "who" can file a lawsuit. A plaintiff must prove they suffered an "injury in fact" or will suffer an imminent injury that is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct. It also requires that the court can redress the injury if it rules in the plaintiff's favor.

• The political question doctrine limits a federal court's jurisdiction to constitutional disputes. It answers "what" the courts can adjudicate. 

• The doctrine of mootness limits courts to actual cases or controversies. If a plaintiff loses a personal stake in the case's outcome, it becomes moot and the court will dismiss it. The mootness doctrine, therefore, says "when" a court can no longer hear a once justiciable case. 

• The ripeness doctrine is the opposite of the mootness doctrine. It limits a federal court's jurisdiction from adjudicating a claim that is not yet justiciable. 

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the ripeness doctrine and its limitations on adjudicating "unripe" disputes. It also covers its constitutional basis and the practical concerns the courts consider. Finally, it includes examples of courts adjudicating ripeness issues. 

Constitutional Basis of the Ripeness Doctrine: Article III

The ripeness doctrine comes from Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which states:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

The Supreme Court has derived the ripeness doctrine — and the other justiciability doctrine — from the clause. This clause indicates that federal courts may only hear "cases" or "controversies." Article III's case or controversy requirement, therefore, limits the courts' judicial powers.

The ripeness and mootness doctrines are intertwined because they both address the question of "when" a court may hear a case. However, the ripeness and standing doctrines are arguably more similar. The standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to essentially prove they have a case or controversy, while the ripeness doctrine deals with whether a dispute is "ripe" or ready for a court to adjudicate it.

The Supreme Court addresses this relationship in the following cases:

• MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. (2007) 

• Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife (1992)

• Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014)

• Warth v. Seldin, (1975)

The ripeness requirement has a constitutional basis, as determined by the Supreme Court. However, the doctrine also allows the judicial branch to rely on prudential considerations when determining whether a case is ripe or not (Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior (2003)). The following section describes some of these prudential considerations.

What Is the Ripeness Doctrine?

The ripeness doctrine limits federal courts' review of disputes that are not fit for "judicial intervention" (Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. (1985)). The doctrine prevents courts from engaging in judicial review of a dispute in which the claimed injury has yet to occur or is too speculative. In other words, the case must present a genuine, present dispute.

For examples, see:

• Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club (1998)

• Texas v. United States (1998)

• Trump v. New York (2020)

Courts use a two-part test to determine whether a dispute is "ripe" or "unripe." The test comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967). It requires courts to determine the following:

1. The "hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration"

2. Whether the issues and record are fit for judicial review

When courts determine the "hardship to the parties," if the court does not consider the case, they may consider some or all of the following:

• A consequential lawsuit is likely unless the plaintiff stops engaging in allegedly lawful behavior

• The federal government will enforce a statute, but it has not done so yet

• Collateral injuries have resulted in substantial hardship

When a court considers whether the issue and records are fit for judicial review, it will review the case as a whole. If the case presents a purely legal question, the court will likely determine it is ripe for review. 

However, if the court determines that the parties must develop the factual record more fully, it may decide that the case is not ripe for review. As part of the doctrine's prudential dimension, the court may also consider whether declining review in the short term will allow the court to resolve the dispute in the future. 

For example, if waiting to decide a case allows the parties to do further fact-finding and let the events in the dispute develop, it may help the court resolve the dispute in the future. 

A court may decide a question of ripeness on its own (sua sponte). Therefore, it does not need to wait for a party to file a motion questioning whether a case is ripe for the court to consider it. 

Examples of Ripeness Issues in Federal Courts

As the United States Library of Congress notes, questions of ripeness "arise in a wide variety of contexts, including challenges to administrative agencies' actions or policies and pre-enforcement challenges to criminal statutes." 

This section describes several examples of courts determining questions involving the ripeness doctrine. 

Administrative Law

When challenges arise concerning an administrative agency's actions or policies, federal courts consider "whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action." 

The question of ripeness in these cases invokes the Constitution's separation of powers. As the Court wrote in Lujan:

"[W]e intervene in the administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific 'final agency action' has an actual or immediately threatened effect." 

It then noted that the legislative and executive branches can more appropriately address "sweeping actions." For example, compare Ohio Forestry Ass'n (1998) and Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. (2001). 

In Ohio Forestry Ass'n, the United States Forestry Service developed a "Land and Resource Management Plan" (the Plan) for a forest in Ohio. The plan required the Forestry Service to take at least five steps before it could permit logging in the forest. 

Two environmental organizations (collectively called the Sierra Club) challenged the plan in federal district court. They argued it permitted "too much logging and too much clearcutting."

The District Court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court then reviewed the case and determined that the case was not ripe. It analyzed the Abbott Laboratories test and concluded the following:

• The plan did not create adverse effects of a strictly legal kind. Therefore, it did not cause the Sierra Club a "significant hardship."

• Delaying judicial review of the case would not cause "significant practical harm" to the Sierra Club. 

• Given the plan's provisions and requirements, the Sierra Club could bring its lawsuit later "when harm is more imminent and clear."

• Judicial review at that time "could interfere with the system Congress specified for the Forest Service to reach logging decisions." Instead, the Court wanted to give Congress and the Forestry Service time to "refine its policies" before reviewing them (the Plan provided for revisions and refinements). The Court wrote that reviewing the case before it could turn out to be unnecessary if Congress and the Forestry Service had time to refine the Plan. 

• The case would "benefit from further factual development of the issues presented."

In Whitman, the Court considered the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations regarding certain air pollution standards. The EPA required states to implement the regulations within five years of their promulgation. 

Several states and private parties — the respondents — challenged the EPA's actions in federal court. Among the issues was whether the case was ripe for judicial review. 

The Supreme Court held that the case was ripe, relying on its decision in Ohio Forestry Ass'n. The Court noted that the case was "purely one of statutory interpretation that would not benefit from further factual development." It also held that reviewing the case would "not interfere with further administrative development," because the EPA had finalized the regulations. 

Additionally, the Court ruled that the case was ripe because of the hardship the states would incur by implementing the regulations. This requirement satisfied the Clean Air Act's "special judicial-review provision permitting pre-enforcement review." Finally, all parties agreed that the regulations were "final agency action," which the Court held was "ripe for review."

Ohio Forestry Ass'n and Whitman demonstrate how the Court decides whether a case is ripe or unripe for review. In Whitman, the Court held that the case was ripe because it was a final agency action, no further fact-finding was needed, and it solely involved a question of law. 

On the other hand, Ohio Forestry Ass'n did not involve final agency action and would require additional fact-finding as to whether the plaintiffs suffered any harm. 

Fifth Amendment Takings Cases

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that the government can take private citizens' property for public use, but it must provide "just compensation" when it does so. Over the years, the Supreme Court has evolved its jurisprudence regarding the "Takings Clause" and the ripeness doctrine.

In Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank (1985), the Supreme Court created a "context-specific ripeness rule" in Takings cases. The rule required a plaintiff to obtain a final decision from a state government regarding the alleged taking before they could challenge it in federal court. It also required the plaintiff to seek compensation from the state before filing a case in federal court. 

In 2005, the Supreme Court decided San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco. There, the Court held that the Constitution's full faith and credit clause prevented a plaintiff who lost their takings case from filing it in federal court. 

The rulings effectively created a Catch-22 by barring a plaintiff from ever filing their takings claim in federal court. On the one hand, Williamson barred a plaintiff from filing their case in federal court before they litigated it in state court. On the other hand, San Remo barred a plaintiff who lost their takings case in state court from filing it in federal court. 

In 2019, the Supreme Court overruled both Williamson and San Remo. In doing so, it instituted a revised ripeness doctrine. The Court wrote that the contradictory rules imposed "an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs." It also noted the rules "conflicted with the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence." 

Today, a plaintiff may file their takings claim in a federal court without first seeking compensation from the state.