Cases ''at Common Law'' .--The coverage of the Amendment is ''limited to rights and remedies peculiarly legal in their nature, and such as it was proper to assert in courts of law and by the appropriate modes and proceedings of courts of law.'' 26 The term ''common law'' was used in contradistinction to suits in which equitable rights alone were recognized at the time of the framing of the Amendment and equitable remedies were administered. 27 Illustrative of the Court's course of decision on this subject are two unanimous decisions holding that civil juries were required, one in a suit by a landlord to recover possession of real property from a tenant allegedly behind on rent, the other in a suit for damages for alleged racial discrimination in the rental of housing in violation of federal law. In the former case, the Court reasoned that its Seventh Amendment precedents ''require[ed] trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action at equity or admiralty.'' 28 The statutory cause of action, the Court found, had several counterparts in the common law, all of which involved a right to trial by jury. In the latter case, the plaintiff had argued that the Amendment was inapplicable to new causes of action created by congressional action, but the Court disagreed. ''The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.'' 29
Omission of provision for a jury has been upheld in a number of other cases on the ground that the suit in question was not a suit at common law within the meaning of the Amendment, or that the issues raised were not peculiarly legal in their nature. 30 Where there is no direct historical antecedentdating to the adoption of the amendment, the court may also consider whether existing precedent and the sound administration of justice favor resolution by judges or juries. Supp.1
The amendment does not apply to cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in which the trial is by a court without a jury, 31 nor does it reach statutory proceedings unknown to the common law, such as an application to a court of equity to enforce an order of an administrative body. 32 Thus, when Congress committed to administrative determination the finding of a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act with a discretion to fix a fine for a violation, the charged party being able to obtain judicial review of the administrative proceeding in a federal court of appeal and the fine being collectible in a suit in federal court, the argument that the absence of a jury trial in the process for a charged party violated the Seventh Amendment was unanimously rejected. ''At least in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated--e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact--the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible.'' 33
On the other hand, if Congress assigns such cases to Article III courts, a jury may be required. In Tull v. United States, 34 the Court ruled that the Amendment requires trial by jury in civil actions to determine liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, but not to assess the amount of penalty. The penal nature of the Clean Water Act's civil penalty remedy distinguishes it from restitution-based remedies available in equity courts, and therefore makes it a remedy of the type that could be imposed only by courts of law. 35 On the other hand, a jury need not invariably determine the remedy in a trial in which it must determine liability. Because the Court viewed assessment of the amount of penalty as involving neither the ''substance'' nor a ''fundamental element'' of a common-law right to trial by jury, it held permissible the Act's assignment of that task to the trial judge.
More recently still, the Court relied on a broadened concept of ''public rights'' to define the limits of congressional power to assign causes of action to tribunals in which jury trials are unavailable. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 36 the Court declared that Congress ''lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury.'' The Seventh Amendment test, the Court indicated, is the same as the Article III test for whether Congress may assign adjudication of a claim to a non-Article III tribunal. 37 As a general matter, ''public rights'' involve '''the relationship between the Government and persons subject to its authority,''' while ''private rights'' relate to '''the liability of one individual to another.''' 38 While finding room for ''some debate,'' the Court determined that a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover for a fraudulent conveyance ''is more accurately characterized as a private rather than a public right,'' at least where the defendant had not submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate. 39
The Continuing Law-Equity Distinction .--The use of the term ''common law'' in the Amendment as indicating those cases in which the right to jury trial was to be preserved reflected, of course, the division of the English and United States legal systems into separate law and equity jurisdictions, in which actions cognizable in courts of law generally were triable to a jury while in equity there was no right to a jury. In the federal court system there were unitary courts having jurisdiction in both law and equity, but distinct law and equity procedures, including the use or nonuse of the jury. Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 merged law and equity into a single civil jurisdiction and established uniform rules of procedure. Legal and equitable claims which previously had to be brought as separate causes of action on different ''sides'' of the court could now be joined in a single action, and in some instances, such as compulsory counterclaims, had to be joined in one action. 40 But the traditional distinction be tween law and equity for purposes of determining when there was a constitutional right to trial by jury remained and led to some difficulty. 41
This difficulty has been resolved by stressing the fundamental nature of the jury trial right and protecting it against diminution through resort to equitable principles. In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 42 the Court held that a district court erred in trying all issues itself in an action in which the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction barring the defendant from instituting an antitrust action against it, and the defendant had filed a counterclaim alleging violation of the antitrust laws and asking for treble damages. It did not matter, the Court ruled, that the equitable claims had been filed first and the law counterclaims involved allegations common to the equitable claims. Subsequent jury trial of these issues would probably be precluded by collateral estoppel, hence ''only under the most imperative circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.'' 43 Then in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 44 in which the plaintiff sought several types of relief, including an injunction and an accounting for money damages, the Court held that, even though the claim for legal relief was incidental to the equitable relief sought, the Seventh Amendment required that the issues pertaining to that legal relief be tried before a jury, because the primary rights being adjudicated were legal in character. Thus, the rule that emerged was that legal claims must be tried before equitable ones and before a jury if the litigant so wished. 45
In Ross v. Bernhard, 46 the Court further held that the right to a jury trial depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the procedural framework in which it is raised. The case involved a stockholder derivative action, 47 which has always been considered to be a suit in equity. The Court agreed that the action was equitable but asserted that it involved two separable claims. The first, the stockholder's standing to sue for a corporation is an equitable issue; the second, the corporation's claim asserted by the stockholder, may be either equitable or legal. Because the 1938 merger of law and equity in the federal courts eliminated any procedural obstacles to transferring jurisdiction to the law side once the equitable issue of standing was decided, the Court continued, if the corporation's claim being asserted by the stockholder was legal in nature, it should be heard on the law side and before a jury. 48 Whether this analysis will be followed in other areas so that the right to a jury trial extends to all legal issues in actions formerly within equity's concurrent jurisdiction is a question now open. 49
Procedures Limiting Jury's Role .--As was noted above, the primary purpose of the Amendment was to preserve the historic line separating the province of the jury from that of the judge, without at the same time preventing procedural improvement which did not transgress this line. Elucidating this formula, the Court has achieved the following results: it is constitutional for a federal judge, in the course of trial, to express his opinion upon the facts, provided all questions of fact are ultimately submitted to the jury, 50 to call the jury's attention to parts of the evidence he deems of special importance, 51 being careful to distinguish between matters of law and matters of opinion in relation thereto, 52 to inform the jury when there is not sufficient evidence to justify a verdict, that such is the case, 53 to require a jury to answer specific interrogatories in addition to rendering a general verdict, 54 to direct the jury, after the plaintiff's case is all in, to return a verdict for the defendant on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, 55 to set aside a verdict which in his opinion is against the law or the evidence, and order a new trial, 56 to refuse defendant a new trial on the condition, accepted by plaintiff, that the latter remit a portion of the damages awarded him, 57 but not, on the other hand, to deny plaintiff a new trial on the converse condition, although defendant accepted it. 58 Nor can a Court of Appeals reverse the jury's finding on the issue of reasonableness of petitioner's conduct, in an indemnity action for damages respondent had paid petitioner's employee, on the ground that as a matter of law petitioner had not acted reasonably; ''[u]nder the Seventh Amendment, that issue should have been left to the jury's determination.'' 59
Directed Verdicts .--In 1913 the Court in Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 60 held that a federal appeals court lacked authority to order the entry of a judgment contrary to the verdict in a case in which the federal trial court should have directed a verdict for one party, but the jury had found for the other party contrary to the evidence; the only course open to either court was to order a new trial. While plainly in accordance with the common law as it stood in 1791, the five-to-four decision was subjected to a heavy fire of professional criticism based on convenience and urging recognition of capacity for growth in the common law. 61 Slocum was then impaired, if not completely undermined, by subsequent holdings.
In the first of these cases, the Court held that a trial court had the right to enter a judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict of the jury after having reserved decision on a motion by the defendant for dismissal on the ground of insufficient evidence. 62 The Court distinguished Slocum while noting that its ruling qualified some of its assertions in Slocum. 63 In the second case 64 the Court sustained a United States district court in rejecting the defendant's motion for dismissal and in peremptorily directing a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that there was ample evidence to support the verdict and that the trial court, in following Arkansas procedure in the diversity action, had acted consistently with the Federal Conformity Act. 65 In the third case, 66 which involved an action against the Government for benefits under a war risk insurance policy which had been allowed to lapse, the trial court directed a verdict for the Government on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, and was sustained in so doing by both the appeals court and the Supreme Court. Three Justices, speaking by Justice Black, dissented in an opinion in which it is asserted that ''today's decision marks a continuation of the gradual process of judicial erosion which in one- hundred-fifty years has slowly worn away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.'' 67 That the Court should experience occasional difficulty in harmonizing the idea of preserving the historic common law covering the relations of judge and jury with the notion of a developing common law is not surprising. 68
Jury Trial Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act .--One aspect of the problem of delineating the respective provinces of judge and jury divided the Justices for a lengthy period but now appears quiescent--cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The argument was frequently couched by the majority in terms of protecting the function of the jury from usurpation by judges intent on subverting and limiting remedial legislation enacted by Congress, 69 and by the minority in terms of the costs to the Supreme Court in time and effort spent in evaluating the quantum of evidence necessary to create a jury question. 70
Although the considerations present in the FELA cases were not inherently different from those in any civil case where the direction of a verdict or a decision of an issue by the court may raise sub silentio the issue whether the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been impaired by court usurpation of the jury function, cases under the FELA, which retained the common-law requirements of negligence as a prerequisite to recovery, involved peculiarly difficult decisions as to the adequacy of proof of negligence. ''Special and important reasons for the grant of certiorari in these cases are certainly present,'' the Court wrote in a leading case, ''when lower federal and state courts persistently deprive litigants of their right to a jury determination.'' 71 The operating test was: ''Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on ground of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death. Similar issues have arisen under such statutes as the Jones Act 72 and the Safety Appliance Act. 73
''Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities.'' 74 A persistent dissent in the line of cases expressed the fear that in FELA cases ''anything that a jury says goes, with the consequences that all meaningful judicial supervision over jury verdicts in such cases has been put at an end. . . . If so, . . . the time has come when the Court should frankly say so. If not, then the Court should at least give expression to the standards by which the lower courts are to be guided in these cases.'' 75
[Footnote 27] Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 443, 447 (1830); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133 (1881). Formerly, it did not apply to cases where recovery of money damages was incidental to equitable relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law. Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 325 (1886); Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng. Co., 243 U.S. 273, 279 (1917). But see Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), discussed infra, p.1459.
[Footnote 29] Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). ''A damage action under the statute sounds basically in tort--the statute merely defines a new legal duty and authorizes the court to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendants' wrongful breach. . . . [T]his cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law.'' Id. at 195. See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (suit against union for back pay for breach of duty of fair representation is a suit for compensatory damages, hence plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial); Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 71, 112 S. Ct. 494 (1991) (similar suit against union for money damages entitles union member to jury trial; a claim for injunctive relief was incidental to the damages claim).
[Footnote 30] Among such actions or issues were, e.g., (1) enforcement of claims against the United States, McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880); see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943); (2) suit under a territorial statute authorizing a special nonjury tribunal to hear claims against a municipality having no legal obligation but based on moral obligation only, Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 534 (1899); see also United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 439 (1896); New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 653 (1877); (3) cancellation of a naturalization certificate for fraud, Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913); (4) reversal of an order to deport an alien, Gee Wah Lee v. United States, 25 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 608 (1928); (5) damages for patent infringement, Filer & Stowell Co. v. Diamond Iron Works, 270 F. 489 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 256 U.S 691 (1921); (6) reversal of an award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45 (1932); and (7) reversal of a decision of customs appraisers on the value of imports, Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 329 (1890); (8) a summary disposition by referee in bankruptcy of issues regarding voidable preferences as asserted and proved by the trustee, Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); and (9) a determination by a judge in calculating just compensation in a federal eminent domain proceeding of the issue as to whether the condemned lands were originally within the scope of the government's project or were adjacent lands later added to the plan, United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970).
[Footnote 1 (1996 Supplement)] Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (interpretation and construction of terms underlying patent claims may be reserved entirely for the court).
[Footnote 31] Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 443 (1830); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460 (1847); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). But see Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
[Footnote 35] The statute itself specified only a maximum amount for the penalty; the Court derived its ''punitive'' characterization from indications in legislative history that Congress desired consideration of the need for retribution and deterrence as well as the need for restitution.
[Footnote 37] ''[I]f a statutory cause of action . . . is not a 'public right' for Article III purposes, then Congress may not assign its adjudication to a specialized non-Article III court lacking 'the essential attributes of the judicial power.' And if the action must be tried under the auspices of an Article III court, then the Seventh Amendment affords the parties the right to a jury trial whenever the cause of action is legal in nature. Conversely, if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.'' Id. at 53-54 (citation omitted).
[Footnote 38] Id. at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 , 51 (1932)). The Court qualified certain statements in Atlas Roofing and in the process refined its definition of ''public rights.'' There are some ''public rights'' cases, the Court explained, in which ''the Federal Government is not a party in its sovereign capacity,'' but which involve ''statutory rights that are integral parts of a public regulatory scheme.'' It is in cases of this nature that Congress may ''dispense with juries as factfinders through its choice of an adjudicative forum.'' This does not mean, however, that Congress may assign ''at least the initial factfinding in all cases involving controversies entirely between private parties to administrative tribunals or other tribunals not involving juries, so long as they are established as adjuncts to Article III courts.'' 492 U.S. at 55 n.10 (emphasis added).
[Footnote 39] Id. at 55. On the other hand, a creditor who does submit a claim against the bankruptcy estate subjects himself to the bankruptcy court's equitable power, and is not entitled to a jury trial when subsequently sued by the bankruptcy trustee to recover preferential monetary transfers. Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
[Footnote 40] 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice Sec. Sec. 38.01-38.05 (2d ed. 1971).
[Footnote 41] Under the old equity rules it had been held that the absolute right to a trial of the facts by a jury could not be impaired by any blending with a claim, properly cognizable at law, of a demand for equitable relief in aid of the legal action or during its pendency. Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 271, 278 (1857). The Seventh Amendment was interpreted to mean that equitable and legal issues could not be tried in the same suit, so that such aid in the federal courts had to be sought in separate proceedings. Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109 (1891); Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669 (1850); Lewis v. Cocks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 466, 470 (1874); Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 573 (1884); Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347, 351 (1886). Where an action at law evoked an equitable counterclaim the trial judge would order the legal issues to be separately tried after the disposition of the equity issues. In this procedure, however, res judicata and collateral estoppel could operate so as to curtail the litigant's right to a jury finding on factual issues common to both claims. But priority of scheduling was considered to be a matter of discretion. Federal statutes prohibiting courts of the United States from sustaining suits in equity where the remedy was complete at law served to guard the right of trial by jury and were liberally construed. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932).
[Footnote 43] Id. at 510-11.
[Footnote 45] If legal and equitable claims are joined, and the court erroneously dismisses the legal claims and decides common issues in the equitable action, the plaintiff cannot be collaterally estopped from relitigating those common issues in a jury trial. Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990).
[Footnote 47] The stockholders' derivative action is a creation of equity made necessary by the traditional concept of ''the corporate entity'' or the ''concept of separate personality.'' That is, the corporation is an entity distinct and separate from its shareholders. Thus, while shareholders were relieved from unlimited liability for corporate liabilities, the complementary result was that harm to the corporation did not confer any right of action upon a shareholder to sue to right that harm. But if the harm were caused by the abuse of those who managed and controlled the corporation, the corporation naturally would not proceed against them and the common law courts would not allow the shareholders to bring an action running to the ''separate personality'' of the corporation; equity thus permitted a derivative action in which the shareholder is permitted to set in motion the adjudication of a cause of action belonging to the corporation. Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 980 (1957).
[Footnote 48] Justices Stewart and Harlan and Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the Seventh Amendment did not expand the right to a jury trial, that the Rules simply preserved the right as it had existed, and that it was error to think that the two could somehow ''magically interact'' to enlarge the right in a way that neither did alone. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 543 (1970).
[Footnote 49] Among the possibilities in which a legal right was enforceable in equity in the absence of an adequate remedy at law are suits to compel specific performance of a contract, suits for cancellation of a contract, and suits to enjoin tortious action. On Ross' implications, see J. Moore, Federal Practice Sec. Sec. 38.11[8.- 8], 38.11 (2d ed. 1971).
[Footnote 51] Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545 (1886) (citing Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 80 (1830); Magniac v. Thompson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 348, 390 (1833); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 131 (1852); Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 302 (1877)).
[Footnote 53] Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99 -100 (1895); Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall,) 116, 121 (1875); Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 109 U.S. 478, 482 (1883); Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 625 (1892); Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U.S. 301 (1896).
[Footnote 59] International Terminal Operating Co. v. N. V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv, Maats., 393 U.S. 74, 75 (1968). But see Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967), where the Court held that the Seventh Amendment does not bar an appellate court from granting a judgment n. o. v. insofar as ''there is no greater restriction on the province of the jury when an appellate court enters judgment n. o. v. than when a trial court does.'' Id. at 322. A federal appellate court may also review a district court's denial of a motion to set aside an award as excessive under an abuse of discretion standard. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (New York State law which requires a review of jury awards to determine if they ''deviate materially from reasonable compensation'' may be adopted by federal district, but not appellate, court exercising diversity jurisdiction).
[Footnote 61] F. James, Civil Procedure 332-33 & n.8 (1965).
[Footnote 63] Id. at 661. The Court's opinions in both Redman and Slocum were authored by Justice Van Devanter.
[Footnote 65] Ch. 255, Sec. 5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), now superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[Footnote 66] Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943), wherein the Court said ''the practice has been approved explicitly in the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' citing Berry v. United States, 312 U.S. 450 (1941). In the latter case the Court remarked that the new rule has given ''district judges, under certain circumstances, . . . the right (but not the mandatory duty) to enter a judgment contrary to the jury's verdict without granting a new trial. But that rule has not taken away from juries and given to judges any part of the exclusive power of juries to weigh evidence and determine contested issues of facts--a jury being the constitutional tribunal provided for trying facts in courts of law.'' Id. at 452-53.
[Footnote 68] See, e.g., Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 386 U.S. 317 (1967), interpreting Rules 50(b), 50(c)(2) and 50(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Seventh Amendment.
[Footnote 69] E.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943), in which Justice Black's opinion of the Court initiated the line of cases here considered; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944). See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 507 -510 (1957). Trial by jury is ''part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers'' under the FELA. Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., supra, 354. ''The difference between the majority and minority of the Court in our treatment of FELA cases concerns the degree of vigilance we should exercise in safeguarding the jury trial--guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.'' Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 17 (1959) (Justice Douglas concurring). ''[T]his Court is vigilant to exercise its power of review . . . to correct instances of improper administration of the Act and to prevent its erosion by narrow and niggardly construction.'' Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., supra, at 509.
[Footnote 72] Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523 (1956); Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521 (1957); Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, 364 U.S. 325 (1960). See also Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); A. & G. Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
[Footnote 74] Id. at 506-07. The cases are collected id. at 510 n.26. The cases are tabulated and categorized in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 -73 (1949) (Justice Douglas concurring), and Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 16 -25 (1959). See also Harrison v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 372 U.S. 248 (1963); Basham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S. 699 (1963).
[Footnote 75] Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 27 -28 (1959) (Justice Harlan dissenting). See also Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 447 (1959) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).